

## BOOK REVIEW

### The Event of Space

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Andrew J. Mitchell. *Heidegger Among the Sculptors: Body, Space, and the Art of Dwelling*.  
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010. 123 pp.

Andrew Mitchell's *Heidegger Among the Sculptors* (hereafter 'HS') is a short but dense, original and profound study, displaying solid scholarship while developing a remarkable account of Heidegger's evolving thinking about space, spatiality, and place, and the way in which, as he considered works of sculptors in the sixties, Heidegger came to rethink the relation between body and space. Heidegger indeed notes that "sculptural structures are bodies" (*Körper*),<sup>1</sup> and Mitchell's central conceit in this book is that "Heidegger's texts present us with a thought of the mutual belonging together of space and body, a thought that allows the art of sculpture to touch us so."<sup>2</sup> Sculpture, Mitchell suggests, "teaches us what it means to be in the world," and Heidegger's texts lead to a "rethinking of body, space, and the relation between these," as well as offering us "a starker conception of corporeality... entailing a new conception of space as well."<sup>3</sup> Further, according to Mitchell, one finds in Heidegger's later writings a rethinking of both "materiality,"<sup>4</sup> in a sense that still remains to be clarified, as well as the motif of the limit, which is, as Mitchell reminds us on several occasions, and as Heidegger famously put it, that at which something begins and not ends. Mitchell

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writes that “things begin at their limits for it is here that they enter into relationships with the rest of the world,” thereby opening to an understanding of the limit as the opening of relationality; indeed, to exist, Mitchell maintains, is “to be exposed at one’s limits,” indicating that bodies exhibit an essential “ecstaticity,” and to such an extent that to be in the world now means “to be ever entering a material space of radiance.”<sup>5</sup> The body is reconceived as a bodily spatiality, that is, as ek-static relationality.<sup>6</sup> There are wonderful developments and insights in this book, from the analysis of degenerate art – thinking together Barlach’s “degenerate forms” with Heidegger’s abandonment of being and what one may call the unsubstantiality or “insufficiency” of being<sup>7</sup> – to the characterization of Heiliger’s heads as “a pointing out to the unknown,”<sup>8</sup> the treatment of the motif of sculpture as figuration of the invisible (“The knowing of the artist is a sighting of the invisible”<sup>9</sup>), the *poiesis* of sculpture bringing-forth [*her-vor-bringen*] that invisible, to Athena gazing at the limit as the place of gathering into one’s own, and to the insights into the materiality and relationality of space.

More broadly, one could say that against a certain *doxa* concerning an alleged neglect by Heidegger of spatiality, and most importantly, of corporeality (as well as concerning an alleged prioritizing of temporality over space in Heidegger’s work), Andrew Mitchell’s book reveals the depth and extent of Heidegger’s thinking of space, place and embodiment in existence. As Mitchell put it, “with Heidegger’s later turn to sculpture, gone is even the suspicion that our existence could take place or be adequately thought apart from spatiality or even be considered along anything like the parameters of *Being and Time*.”<sup>10</sup> By revealing several little-known texts by Heidegger on sculptors from the sixties, Mitchell also begins to fill a major lacuna in the scholarship on Heidegger and his thinking of space and embodiment, but also his understanding of art. For, as Mitchell notes, although there is a substantial amount of work on Heidegger and art, and even on Heidegger and space, there is precious little on the motif of sculpture in Heidegger’s reflections on art, despite the fact that “Art and Space” has been available in English since 1973, and Heidegger’s “Remarks on

Art-Sculpture-Space” since 1996 in German.<sup>11</sup> Mitchell’s contribution is therefore also important in this respect.

### SPACE, PLACE, EVENT

Why appeal to sculpture to engage the question of space, or rather, as Heidegger puts it, the question of what is singularly proper (*das Eigentümliche*) to space? Heidegger tells us in the 1969 text “Art and Space,” at the occasion of an exhibit of the Spanish Basque sculptor Eduardo Chillida, that it is indeed a matter of questioning about what is proper to space, that is, “the question of what space as space is.”<sup>12</sup> This requires, in turn, to think space, as it were, from space itself! “What is proper to space,” Heidegger writes, “must show itself from space itself.”<sup>13</sup> Indeed, far from attempting to derive space from another phenomenon, allegedly more primordial, here Heidegger insists that space should be approached as belonging to those originary phenomena (*Urphänomene*), that is, the sort of phenomenon behind which there is “nothing” to which it could be traced back.<sup>14</sup> Further, space is said to be a phenomenon through “the discovery of which humans are overcome by a kind of awe, to the point of anxiety [*Angst*],” in the sense that not only is there nothing behind it, but also because, “in front of it, there is no evasion to something else” possible.<sup>15</sup>

Sculpture would allow us to engage these questions, and give us access to the proper of space, as indeed Heidegger engages the proper of space *from sculpture*. Heidegger’s encounters with sculptors provoked him to return to the question of space, a theme which was, if not neglected, at least somewhat derivative with respect to world and temporality in *Being and Time*. Sculpture enacts a *confrontation* with space: as Heidegger explains in “Remarks on Art-Sculpture-Space” (the text of which was an address given by Martin Heidegger at the opening of the Bernhard Heiliger sculpture exposition on October 3, 1964 at the Erker-Galerie in St. Gallen, Switzerland): “Now one is quick to point out that today plastic art, and here above all sculpture, proceeds once again to find its proper place... This lies in the fact that it has an exceptional

relation to space, that it can be understood in a certain regard as a confrontation with space.”<sup>16</sup>

A first clarification may be useful at the outset. In “Art and Space” Heidegger writes: “The sculptural body embodies [*verkörpert*] something.”<sup>17</sup> Does it embody a physical body? No. A head, for instance, “is not a physical body [*Körper*] equipped with eyes and ears, but rather a bodily phenomenon [*Leibphänomen*], shaped by the seeing and hearing of a being-in-the-world.”<sup>18</sup> Thus, when a sculptor models a head, he or she is not merely making a copy of the visible surface, for “in truth the artist shapes the properly invisible, namely the way in which this head looks into the world, how it abides in the open of space, approached by the humans and things therein.”<sup>19</sup> The sculpture does not shape the physical body but the “bodying” (*Leiben*) of being-in-the-world, which is, we should note, *invisible. Sculpture brings into view the invisible.* This is why Heidegger adds: “The artist brings the essentially invisible into figure and, when he or she corresponds to the essence of art, each time allows something to come into view that until then was never seen.”<sup>20</sup>

The sculptural body thus does not embody a physical body but the “bodying” of being-in-the-world. “Does the sculptural body embody space?”<sup>21</sup> In fact, it does not, as Heidegger explains that sculpture embodies not space, but *places*: “Art as sculpture: no occupying of space. Sculpture would not be a confrontation with space.” Instead, sculpture “would be the embodiment of places [*Orten*].”<sup>22</sup> In contrast with Kant for instance, for whom various places and locations are possible on the basis of the one *a priori* space as infinite given magnitude, here Heidegger reasserts what he had already stated in “Building Dwelling Thinking,” namely that “*spaces receive their being from locations [Orten] and not from ‘space.’*”<sup>23</sup> Heidegger clarifies that “place is not located in a pre-given space, after the manner of physical-technological space. The latter unfolds itself only through the reigning of places of a region.”<sup>24</sup> “Space” is here identified with scientific homogeneous space, that abstract space which Heidegger characterizes as that “homogeneous separation that is not distinct in any of its possible places.”<sup>25</sup> Mitchell shows very well how, in contrast to this homogeneous space

– which is referred throughout the book as “frictionless,” a “frictionless empty field [for the most efficient cycle of consumption]”<sup>26</sup> – there is, for instance in Heiliger’s sculptures, a friction, a “broken open” or exposed quality that renders space *heterogeneous*, so that these sculptures “indicate a more refined conception of *exteriority*, where the forms show signs of distress and weathering.” Indeed, these figures are “suffering this outside already. The purity of the surface is compromised, matter is striated and punctured, eroded.”<sup>27</sup> Not a frictionless space, as “sculpture thickens space, gathers it together and knots it in ways that are felt throughout its surroundings.”<sup>28</sup>

Returning to the reversal from space to place, Heidegger continues by insisting that it is important “to learn to recognize that things themselves are places and do not merely belong in a place.”<sup>29</sup> And already in “Building Dwelling Thinking,” Heidegger had shown that “only something *that is itself a location* can make space for a site. *The location is not already there before the bridge is.*”<sup>30</sup> What kind of place is here spoken of? Certainly a thing-place as Mitchell rightly stresses (a place that would be a thing, and a thing that would be a place), but also perhaps a place in the sense of what *takes place*, so that a place would now name where something is happening, is taking place, where there is a taking place. Heidegger indeed refers to spacing as a happening, states that in spacing, “a happening [*ein Geschehen*] at once speaks and conceals itself,” indicates that the “granting of places happens [*geschieht*]” and that “the character of this happening [*Geschehens*] is such a granting.”<sup>31</sup> And with this motif of this *happening of space*, with this attempt to think space (*Raum*) from the event of “spacing” (*Räumen*) – in fact, in “Building Dwelling Thinking” Heidegger tells us that “a space is something that has been spaced, or made room for [*Ein Raum ist etwas Eingeräumtes*]”<sup>32</sup> – aren’t we invited as it were to approach space from *Ereignis*? Heidegger actually suggested this explicitly in a passage from *On Time and Being*, adding a marginal note referring to the essay “Art and Space.” Space, he writes, should be thought on the basis of *Ereignis*: “Since time as well as being can only be thought from *Ereignis* as the gifts of *Ereignis*, the relation of space to *Ereignis* must

also be considered in an analogous way,” which also implies inquiring into “the origin of space” and “the singular proper being of place.”<sup>55</sup> *Ereignis* is also named in the “Remarks on Art-Sculpture-Space,”<sup>54</sup> at a crucial moment when Heidegger enfolds what is “most proper” to space. So a first question would be: should one not elaborate further on the motif of space as event, on place as taking-place, and on the role of *Ereignis* in that thought? And, since in Mitchell’s reading space is bodily, how would one think the bodying of the body (*Leib*) from *Ereignis*?

#### EMPTINESS AND MATERIALITY

Mitchell insists that space must be understood in terms of the *materiality of bodies*: “Space must become a medium of exchange, not simply defined by an absence of body. Space must be understood ‘materially,’ or rather, as no longer antipodally opposed to bodies.”<sup>55</sup> A provocative and fascinating claim, but which needs to be immediately confronted with what Heidegger says about space in relation to bodies in the 1969 essay on “Art and Space”: namely, that it is the metaphysical tradition that has always thought of space in terms of bodies (although, to be sure, he means “body” there as *Körper*, and not *Leib*), a tradition from which Heidegger wants to part. (One may raise a question in passing here, since this distinction appears here. Mitchell writes throughout the book of “bodies,” and how space is never to be thought without bodies. But how does one mean “bodies” here, given that distinction between *Körper* and *Leib*? Is the distinction maintained, or on the contrary blurred in this reference to “bodies”? Indeed, Heidegger states that the lived body only exists as mine, as my body, as “each time mine.”<sup>56</sup> Thus, in what sense does Mitchell refer to “bodies” in the third person of the plural?) With respect to this relation between body and space, Heidegger writes: “Despite all the differences in the manner of thinking between Greek and modern thought, space is understood in the *same* way, as from *bodies*. Space is three-dimensional extension, *extensio*. In it, the bodies and their movements have their trajectory, their station, their permeable stretches and expanses, which they run their course in, as it were.”<sup>57</sup> In contrast with that tradition, Heidegger then inquires about the proper

of space itself: “But now what is space itself – in its ownness [*in seinem Eigenen*]:?” And then he adds this clearly not insignificant clarification: “What is space as space – *thought without consideration to bodies?*”<sup>38</sup> This seems to go against the grain of what Mitchell proposes to show, and this is probably why he felt compelled to write that “despite appearances Heidegger might give us to the contrary,” space is never “apart from bodies.”<sup>39</sup> Now this may be the case, but in the meantime the reader first sees Heidegger emptying space of bodies! And how could it be otherwise if space is approached in terms of a spacing that makes room, a spacing which means a clearing out, a freeing, a setting free into a free area (*freigeben ein Freies*), the freeing of the open itself (*Offenes*):<sup>40</sup> Should this spacing not be taken in a certain sense as a “nothing” (one recalls here how Kant, in his “Remark to the Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection” in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, included space in his table of the Nothing as “an empty intuition without an object”<sup>41</sup>). Heidegger clarifies further the sense of his approach: he seeks to raise the question of space, not from something other (bodies), but *from itself*: what is space as space – thought without consideration to physical bodies? The answer to this question is simple, he tells us, but for that very reason, he continues, also the most difficult. Why? Because “the common conception only holds something to be clarified [*geklärt*] when it is explained [*erklärt*] on the basis of *something else, in the present case, space in relation to physical bodies*. Opposed to this, for a thinking that is appropriate to the matter at hand, an issue is only experienced in its ownness [*in ihrem Eigenen*] when we renounce explanation and let go of referring something back to something else. Instead, it is important to bring the matter into view *purely from itself, just as it shows itself*.”<sup>42</sup> Heidegger is attempting to access what is most proper to space, and that first means: *independently of bodies*. To think space from space, that is, as we will see, as the event of spacing, and perhaps even, as I suggested above, from *Ereignis*.

How does one reconcile these passages with the claims regarding Mitchell’s material and bodily dimension of space? Specifically, how does one reconcile the characterization of space as a “materiality”

with Heidegger's developments in "Art and Space" on the emptiness of space?<sup>45</sup> (Mitchell recalls that Heidegger also speaks of the "emptiness of being" in *The End of Philosophy*<sup>44</sup>). This is a difficulty, with which Mitchell clearly struggles on page 76, and already page 69. For, confronted with Heidegger's developments on the emptiness of space (and Chillida's, where, as we are about to read, Mitchell actually makes Chillida say the opposite of what he says), Mitchell writes that "emptiness is never empty" and that "there is no void." Let us read here that passage from Chillida that Mitchell cites, taken from an interview given in 1967. Chillida states: "Sculpture and music exist in the same harmonious and ever developing space. The volume of musical sound fills the silence with tension; similarly *there could be no volume in sculpture without the emptiness of space. In the void the form can continue to vibrate beyond its limits.*"<sup>45</sup> Clearly, Chillida is emphasizing the presence of the empty, indeed of the void, as an element of music and sculpture. For Heidegger insists that bodies are held apart (that is precisely the "void" of spacing) and thus gathered and brought in relation from this spacing, this "emptiness." What Heidegger – and Chillida – say is that emptiness is not nothing ("*Die Leere ist nicht nichts*"), not a deficiency, not a lack, that is, not insignificant, but not that there is no emptiness. On the contrary. I cite Heidegger:

And what would become of the emptiness of space? Often enough, it simply appears to be a deficiency. Emptiness then counts as the filling-out that cavities and gaps lack. Presumably, however, emptiness is precisely related to the proper singularity [*Eigentümlichen*] of place, and thus is not a lack but rather a bringing-forth.<sup>46</sup>

Clearly Heidegger posits the emptiness of space (it is said to belong to what is proper to space), but attempts to rethink it in a positive way as the possibility for places: place happens from the empty: "To empty the collected fruit into a basket means: to prepare this place for it."<sup>47</sup> These passages are stating the opposite of what Mitchell claims they do, as they stress that there must be emptiness for place to take place,

as music needs silence to resonate. Certainly, Mitchell is attempting to think a materiality of space, but what conception of materiality is here presupposed? What conception of the materiality of the body? To go in this direction does not necessarily require the rejection of the motif of the empty, except by presupposing a traditional sense of materiality as that which fills the empty. Now, since space and spacing are, as Mitchell himself writes on page 72, the “spacing apart of things,” or what Nancy calls “the parting of things,” are we not called to think a spaced-open, “differential” materiality? A spaced-open materiality that would accommodate the thought of the limit as exposure and relationality that Mitchell tries to develop in his book? Space as the gap allowing for a thing to come forth as shared out, as a singularity in Nancy’s sense? On page 44, Mitchell seems to go in that direction, writing that “space is a separation that allows for contact” but then he seems to take it back or at least qualify it by adding immediately that space is not a gap. A short discussion here of the difference between separation and gap would have been helpful.

#### **THE LEGACY OF BEING AND TIME**

Mitchell states that, while Heidegger’s engagements with sculpture in the sixties are “deeply enmeshed in his earlier thinking,” they “emerge from a rethinking of body and space that departs from the earlier conceptions of *Being and Time*” and instead grow out of “the trajectory of inquiry opened in ‘The Origin of the Work of Art,’ developing these latter ideas in a more explicitly corporeal vein than ever before in his work.”<sup>48</sup> Let me briefly investigate this claim, and in particular with respect to the contrasts drawn by Mitchell between *Being and Time* and Heidegger’s later work on sculpture and space. Mitchell claims that in *Being and Time* – but also in *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* – Dasein is “pre-spatial,” not fully unfolded in its spatiality, although he does note the inscription of space in the very term “Da-sein.”<sup>49</sup> As Heidegger clarified in the Zollikon seminars, “In *Being and Time*, *being-open* (*Da-sein*) means *being-open* (*Da-sein*). The ‘Da’ [of *Da-sein*] is determined here as ‘the open.’ *This openness has the character of space.*

*Spatiality belongs to the clearing* [Lichtung]. It belongs to the open in which we sojourn as existing [human] beings....<sup>50</sup> Yet Mitchell maintains that Dasein's spatiality is, as it were, derivative, that is, derived from being-in-the-world: Dasein has a being-in-space "only on the basis of Being-in-the-world in general."<sup>51</sup> The conclusion from this is that somehow for Heidegger being-in-the-world could be without space, clearly an inference that is Mitchell's responsibility alone.

Mitchell's basic assumption requires that this derivation of space from world is absent in Heidegger's later writings. However, one must note on the contrary the same insistence in later Heidegger on the indissociability between world and space, reasserted in a passage from the 1964 "Remarks on Art-Sculpture-Space," where Heidegger shows how space is intertwined, indissociable, from world: "The human is not bounded by the surface of his supposed body. When I stand here, then I only stand here as a human insofar as I am simultaneously there by the window and, for example, outside on the street and in town, *briefly put: I am in a world.*"<sup>52</sup> And when Heidegger thematizes the bodying of the body as *Leib*, he refers it to the existential structure of Dasein as being-in-the-world: "The *bodying* [Leiben] of the body is determined by the way of my being. The bodying of the body, therefore, is a way of Da-sein's being."<sup>53</sup> And ultimately: "*Bodying* as such belongs to being-in-the-world."<sup>54</sup>

Mitchell develops that same critique in a reading of "neutral Dasein" in *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, claiming that neutral Dasein is "prior" to its factual dispersion in space. Again, one could discuss this interpretation by showing that there is no *essential* difference between neutral Dasein and factual Dasein, but in any case Mitchell asserts that this approach is completely abandoned in Heidegger's later work on sculpture. As Mitchell puts it: "In the later work on sculpture, this methodological conceit is abandoned in order to think the body from out of itself, space from out of itself, and not through a factual/existential divide, however nuanced it may be."<sup>55</sup> I will not pursue this question further, since clearly Mitchell is attempting to draw a contrast between Heidegger's later writings and his early work, sadly at the price

of foisting a reductive reading of *Being and Time* upon the reader. A note of regret, then: in general, it should be possible to do justice to the originality of Heidegger's late writings without doing injustice to his early writings.

Mitchell complains that space is too tied to the world of concern, to the *things* one encounters in our concerned dealings: the existential spatiality of Dasein "is born of its circumspective and concerned ties to the world" and "such a space is ultimately too narrow to accommodate the excessive character of embodiment found in Heidegger's later work."<sup>56</sup> Yet Mitchell then writes that in *Being and Time* space "is eerily devoid of objects,"<sup>57</sup> an apparent contradiction that might have required some clarification. One in fact might argue that being-in-the-world, and precisely in the for-the-sake-of-which Mitchell refers to, means precisely that Dasein in its own being-a-self cannot exist apart from the things with which it is involved concernedly. Mitchell gives the example of the chair not touching the wall, to conclude that for Heidegger "the things themselves do not enter space,"<sup>58</sup> alluding to a certain anthropocentrism in Heidegger's analyses of space (I will return to this motif). However, one might consider that rather than a neglect of objects, it instead indicates that touch is possible when there is an ecstatic openness, *a space or spacing*, when a world opens up and things give themselves in it, and thus when there is a "making-room" or a "spacing."

With respect to the question of the world, and an alleged anthropocentrism in Heidegger's analyses, Mitchell claims that in *Being and Time* Dasein is as it were the center of space: "First, let us note that Dasein is, in a certain sense, at the 'center' of this space, or at the very least it organizes this space around its own ends. Insofar as space arises through the equipment attending the projects of our concern and all of our equipment points around to Dasein itself as its ultimate purpose, space arises with Dasein as its focus." In other words, space would become "a function of Dasein" so that *Being and Time* only proposes in for Mitchell a "domesticated space," and that "gone is the sense of being lost in space or the feeling of its overwhelming

excess.”<sup>59</sup> A question at the outset: what does “overwhelming excess” mean here, given the role of the limit in spacing, as that from which something is gathered into its ownness? And in light of what Heidegger says about space and limit in “Building Dwelling Thinking,” namely that space “is something that has been spaced or made room for, something that is cleared and free, *namely within a boundary*, Greek *peras*,” is Heidegger then referring to the essential role of the limit and concluding that space essentially includes the *horismos*, the horizon, the boundary, that “space is in essence that for which room has been made, *that which is let into its bounds*”?<sup>60</sup> There seem to be three motifs at play here: the overwhelming excess, which seems to imply a transgression of limits, a taking place that exceeds places; the determination of the limit as that which gathers into one’s own; and third, the limit as place of exposure and opening of relationality (there clearly is throughout Mitchell’s book a constant unreferenced reference to Jean-Luc Nancy’s work on limit, exposure, and relationality). What is the relation between these three senses? What is the relation between these senses as they play in Mitchell’s interpretation in the book on space and body? What, in fact, is the relation between Nancy’s thought of the limit, exposure and relationality, and Heidegger’s work on space? Some unfolding of these questions would have been helpful, especially if one notes that the crucial question of expropriation and appropriation plays in this issue: the expropriating exposure, and/or the appropriating limit. Finally, does this overwhelming excess, this ecstatic expropriation, not point towards a certain excess with respect to place and to being in a place, to a certain being “out of place,” “without a place”? Heidegger stated, and we cited it above, that space brings up anxiety, and one in fact finds a fascinating passage in §40 of *Being and Time*, where Heidegger speaks of the presence in anxiety of a certain *nowhere*. “The fact that what is threatening is *nowhere* characterizes what anxiety is about.”<sup>61</sup> What oppresses us in anxiety is a “nowhere,” a lack of place. If sculpture could figure the invisible, could it also figure such a “nowhere,” such “being out of place”? What

“place” can one give to this “out-of-place” that Levinas opposed to Heidegger and his motif of dwelling, in this reading?

#### THE HUMAN BEING IN THE EVENT OF SPACE

Mitchell’s entire book is structured by a somewhat artificial opposition between an early, anthropocentric Heidegger, and a later work that would escape that horizon. But this contrast is far too facile to be convincing. Let me suggest that the early elaborations on space no more commit Heidegger to an anthropocentrism than do the later works abandon a reference to the distinctive place of the human being in the event of space. With respect to the first point, I would note that the understanding of *Being and Time* as an anthropo-centrism was famously Sartre’s and the existentialists’ misunderstanding of Heidegger, a misunderstanding that Heidegger endeavored to correct in the “Letter on Humanism.” In fact, it was as early as 1929 that Heidegger attempted to answer that charge, in a footnote from “On the Essence of Ground.” His clarification is most revealing, for it involves a certain reference to space and the ec-static. “As regards the reproach... of an ‘anthropocentric standpoint’ in *Being and Time*,” Heidegger asks, what “dangers are entailed by an anthropocentric [Dasein coming to the fore, the center] standpoint that precisely puts its *entire* effort *solely* into showing that the *essence* of Dasein that there stands ‘at the center’ is ecstatic, i.e., ‘*excentric*?’”<sup>62</sup> In other words, Dasein is not at the center, because it is itself the ecstatic being, *outside*-itself, determined as transcendence, all categories, one will admit, that have something to do with space, especially since for Heidegger, “*Spacing* = space only from standing in the clearing [*der Inständigkeit in der Lichtung*], ecstatic.”<sup>63</sup> It thus becomes problematic to speak of center here, of *anthropocentrism*, especially since Dasein is not another name for the anthropological being, Dasein being but the *Da-* of *Sein*.

Now, with respect to a thinking that goes beyond anthropocentrism in the later works (an anthropocentrism that may not even have existed!), I will simply point out that Heidegger retains the distinctive role of the human in the event of space and of the body as bodying.

In fact, Heidegger makes clear that any consideration of the bodily “must always start with the basic constitution of *human* existing, that is, from being-*human* as Da-sein.”<sup>64</sup> Mitchell draws a contrast between space through the human in the early work and a thinking of space from things and bodies in later writings. But let us look at the text more closely. We last saw Heidegger emptying bodies from space in order to think space from space itself. What does he say next? That space... spaces! What is ownmost [*Eigenste*] to space is that it spaces. “What, then, is space as space? Answer: Space spaces [*der Raum räumt*]. Spacing means *clearing out, making free*, the setting free into a free area [*freigeben ein Freies*], an open [*Offenes*]. In so far as space spaces, freely gives a free area, then it first affords with this free area the possibility of regions, of nearness and farness, of directions and bounds, the possibilities of distances and magnitudes.”<sup>65</sup> And then? That humans are involved in, needed, indeed *required by* that spacing, Heidegger adding the following: first, having stated that “it is worth seeing how the *human* is in space,” he answers that human beings are not in space like physical bodies, but in such a way that they arrange space [*den Raum einräumt*], so that they do not have physical bodies and are not physical bodies [*Körper*]. Rather, the human lives his body [*lebt seinen Leib*]. He then writes: “Back to space: space is space insofar as it spaces (clears out), freely gives the free area for regions and places and paths. But space also spaces only as space *insofar as* the human arranges space, concedes this free giving, and lets himself in it, establishing himself and the things in it, and in this way protects space as space.”<sup>66</sup> Therefore, Heidegger continues, “in order to space *as space*, space needs the human being,” Heidegger evoking at that point the “mysterious” relation here disclosed that touches not only on the relation between the human being and space and time, but also the relation of being to the human being, and at that point he names: *Ereignis*. *Ereignis* is thus the site of what Heidegger called at the beginning of the essay the “circle” between artist and art, the site where original space occurs, in the co-proprietion of humans with

*Ereignis*. One glimpses this co-appropriation in the fact that space only spaces insofar as human beings make room for space.

Would one consider this last characterization as being still “anthropocentric”? Probably not, I imagine, as in fact Mitchell shows convincingly on pages 83 and 86, or at the very least not in its traditional sense, and yet Heidegger continues to posit the distinctive privileged role of the human being in the givenness of original space (Heidegger speaking of that “arranging of space distinctive to the human”<sup>67</sup>) and in the exposure/relation to all things. Isn’t the relationality spoken of in the book in fact thought by Heidegger from the bodying of the human being? The following passage seems to suggest as much: “The human lives in that he bodies [*leiben*] and thus is he admitted into the open of space, and through this self-admittance [*Sich-einlassen*] from the outset he already resides in a relation to his fellow humans and things.”<sup>68</sup> In the Zollikon seminar, Heidegger goes even further in this vein, and in a session from July 6, 1964, explains that space is not open for things (things do not enter space), that there is no space without the human being, that only humans have access to space, that the human being and space belong to each other, indeed that “the animal does not experience space *as space*.”<sup>69</sup> In “Remarks on Art-Sculpture-Space” he makes the claim that the human being as such is spatializing, “spatial like *no* other entity.”<sup>70</sup> How are we to understand these statements, how are we to reconcile them with Mitchell’s claim that “Heidegger’s later thought removes the ecstatic privilege from Dasein and sees it as integral to all appearing whatsoever”?<sup>71</sup> Questions that are indicative of how much Mitchell’s fine book gives us to think, as if to confirm what Heidegger said in closing his 1964 lecture of sculpture, namely that “more philosophical than science and more rigorous, i.e., nearer to the essence of things – is art.”<sup>72</sup>

## Notes

- 1 “Die Kunst und der Raum” (1969) in *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, 1910-76*, GA 13: 203-211. Translated by Charles H. Seibert as “Art and Space,” *Man and World* 6 (1973): 3-8, and reprinted with the same title in *The Heidegger Reader*, edited by Günter Figal (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2007), 305. English pagination is cited as AS, followed by page numbers of *The Heidegger Reader*. I wish to thank my colleague Jon Cogburn for his telling comments on this essay.
- 2 *Heidegger Among the Sculptors* (hereafter ‘hs’), 14.
- 3 HS, 1.
- 4 HS, 2.
- 5 HS, 1, 52.
- 6 HS, 81.
- 7 HS, 22.
- 8 HS, 47.
- 9 HS, 60.
- 10 HS, 8.
- 11 See *Bemerkungen zu Kunst – Plastik – Raum* (hereafter cited as ‘KPR’). I have generally followed Andrew Mitchell’s translation of this text, with some occasional modifications, as well as consulted another version from Jedidiah Mohring, from Southern Connecticut State University and Marquette University.
- 12 GA 13: 205/AS, 306.
- 13 GA 13: 205/AS, 306.
- 14 GA 13: 205/AS, 306.
- 15 GA 13: 205/AS, 306; tm.
- 16 KPR, 6.
- 17 GA 13: 205/AS, 306.
- 18 KPR, 14.
- 19 KPR, 14.
- 20 KPR, 14.
- 21 GA 13: 205/AS, 306.

- 22 GA 13: 208/AS, 308.  
23 GA 7: 156/PLT, 152.  
24 GA 13: 208/AS, 308.  
25 GA 13: 205/AS, 306.  
26 HS, 39.  
27 HS, 44.  
28 HS, 93.  
29 GA 13: 208/AS, 308.  
30 GA 7: 156/PLT, 151, my emphasis.  
31 GA 13: 207/AS, 307-308.  
32 GA 7: 156/PLT 152.  
33 “Zeit und Sein,” in *Zur Sache des Denkens* (1927-1968), GA 14: 28-29 = *On Time and Being* 23; tm.  
34 KPR, 15.  
35 HS, 1-2.  
36 ZS 113/86.  
37 KPR, 11.  
38 KPR, 12, my emphasis.  
39 HS, 90.  
40 KPR, 13.  
41 Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), A 292/B 348, p. 383.  
42 KPR, 12-13, my emphasis; tm.  
43 GA 13: 209/AS, 309.  
44 HS, 24.  
45 Cited in HS, 69, my emphasis.  
46 GA 13: 209/AS, 309; tm.  
47 GA 13: 209/AS, 309.  
48 HS, 14.  
49 HS, 3.  
50 ZS 283/225, my emphasis.  
51 HS, 5.  
52 KPR, 13-14, my emphasis.

- 53 ZS 113/86; tm.  
54 ZS 244/196.  
55 HS, 4.  
56 HS, 6.  
57 HS, 7-8.  
58 HS, 8.  
59 HS, 4.  
60 GA 7: 156/PLT 152, my emphasis.  
61 SZ 186.  
62 "On the Essence of Ground," *Pathmarks*, 371, note 66.  
63 KPR, 19.  
64 ZS 292/231, my emphasis.  
65 KPR, 13.  
66 KPR, 13-15.  
67 KPR, 14.  
68 KPR, 13.  
69 ZS 19/16.  
70 KPR, 19.  
71 HS, 77.  
72 KPR, 16.